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Abstract—A crowdsourced wireless community network can
effectively alleviate the limited coverage issue of Wi-Fi access
points (APs), by encouraging individuals (users) to share their
private residential Wi-Fi APs with each other. This paper presents
the first study on the users’ joint membership selection and
network access problem in such a network. Specifically, we
formulate the problem as a two-stage dynamic game: Stage I
corresponds to a membership selection game, in which each user
chooses his membership type; Stage II corresponds to a set of
network access games, in each of which each user decides his
WiFi connection time on the AP at his current location. We
analyze the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) systematically,
and study whether and how best response dynamics can reach
the equilibrium. Through numerical studies, we further explore
how the equilibrium changes with the users’ mobility patterns
and network access evaluations. We show that a user with a
more popular home location, a smaller travel time, or a smaller
network access evaluation is more likely to choose a specific type
of membership called Bill. We further demonstrate how the net-
work operator can optimize its pricing and incentive mechanism
based on the game equilibrium analysis in this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The global mobile data traffic is growing explosively in
recent years, with an anticipated annual growth rate of 61%
from 2013 to 2018 [1]. The global cellular network capacity,
however, grows much slower than the mobile data traffic. To
fill in such a gap, the Wi-Fi network is playing an increasingly
important role in carrying the mobile data traffic.1 The fast
growth of Wi-Fi technology is due to several factors including
the low cost of a Wi-Fi access point (AP), simple installation,
easy management, and high data rate [2]. However, the large-
scale deployment of Wi-Fi networks is often restricted by the
limited coverage of a single Wi-Fi AP (typically tens of meters
indoors and hundreds of meters outdoors [3]), which is much
smaller than the coverage of a cellular tower. Hence, it is
expensive for a single network operator to deploy enough Wi-
Fi APs to cover an entire city or nation.
The crowdsourced wireless community network comes out
as a promising solution to enlarge the Wi-Fi coverage at a
low cost. The key idea is to encourage individuals (users) to
This work is supported by the General Research Funds (Project Number
CUHK 412713 and 14202814) established under the University Grant Com-
mittee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.
1According to Cisco’s report [1], around 45% of the global mobile data
traffic was offloaded to the fixed network through Wi-Fi or femtocell in 2013.
share their private residential Wi-Fi APs with each other, hence
crowdsource the coverages of many private Wi-Fi APs [4],
[5]. This can fully utilize the capacity of millions of Wi-Fi
APs already installed, without requiring new installations by
any single operator. Meanwhile, by joining such a community
network, each user can use not only his own AP (when staying
at home2), but also other users’ APs (when traveling outside).
Clearly, the success of such a crowdsourced network largely
depends on the active participations and contributions of many
Wi-Fi owners, and hence requires the careful design of a
proper economic incentive mechanism.
One prominent commercial example of wireless community
networks is FON [6], which has more than 13 millions member
Wi-Fi APs globally.3 In FON, the operator incentivizes Wi-Fi
AP owners (to share their private APs with others) by using
two different incentive schemes, corresponding to two kinds
of memberships: Linus and Bill [7]. As a Linus, a user does
not receive any compensation when other users access his
AP; meanwhile, he can use other FON members’ APs free
of charge. As a Bill, a user receives compensation when other
users access his AP; meanwhile, he needs to pay for using
other APs. Moreover, if a user does not own a Wi-Fi AP, he
can still access the FON network as an Alien, who needs to pay
for using any AP in the FON network. The payments of Alien
and Bill (for using other APs) are often time usage-based (i.e.,
proportional to the Wi-Fi connection time) [8]. Our study is
motivated by the commercial successful example of FON.
B. Model and Contributions
In this work, we consider a wireless community network
launched by a network operator. The network consists of a set
of users, including subscribers and Aliens. Each subscriber
is the owner of a private residential Wi-Fi AP associated
with a specific home location, and shares his AP’s Internet
access with other users (subscribers and Aliens). Similar as
FON, we also assume that the network operator offers two
types of memberships (i.e., Linus and Bill) to its subscribers.
2We use “home” to denote the location of the user’s own Wi-Fi AP, which
can correspond to residence, office, or even public areas (such as for those
Wi-Fi provided by coffee shops).
3FON is especially popular in several European countries, such as UK,
France, Belgium, and Netherlands, where FON provides good Wi-Fi coverage
in almost all locations. It’s also popular in South America and some East
Asian countries (such as Japan and South Korea), where the FON provides
good Wi-Fi coverage in several metropolitan areas.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
01
53
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
4 F
eb
 20
16
Subscriber 2
(Owner of AP 2)
AP 1
AP 2
AP 4
AP 3
Subscriber 3
(Owner of AP 3)
Subscriber 1
(Owner of AP 1)
Subscriber 4
(Owner of AP 4)
Roaming
R
oa
m
in
g
Ro
am
in
g
Alien 5
(Not owning AP)
Alien 6
(Not owning AP)
Figure 1: Wireless Community Network Model
Each Alien does not own Wi-Fi AP, but can use subscribers’
APs with a certain fee. Users may travel (roam) outside his
home location, and can use other subscribers’ APs if needed.
Figure 1 illustrates such a wireless community network, where
subscriber 1 (owner of AP 1) stays at home and connects to
his own AP, subscribers 2 and 3 travel to subscriber 4’s home
location and connect to AP 4, Alien 5 travels to subscriber
2’s home location and connects to AP 2, and subscriber 4
and Alien 6 roam at areas without Wi-Fi coverage and cannot
connect to network.
The network operator and the users (subscribers and Aliens)
interact in the following order. First, the operator announces
the pricing and incentive mechanism, i.e., the usage-based
price charged to Bills and Aliens and the percentage of
revenue shared with Bills. Second, each subscriber chooses his
membership type for a given time period (e.g., six months),
considering his mobility pattern within that time period as well
as his demand and evaluation for network access during travel.
Third, if travelling to a particular AP’s location at a particular
time slot (e.g., five minutes), each user further decides his
network access time on that AP during that time slot, taking
the network congestion into consideration. In this work, we
will focus on the user decision problem, given the pricing and
incentive mechanism announced by the operator.
More specifically, we will study the users’ joint membership
selection and network access problem, and formulate the
problem as a two-stage dynamic game. In Stage I, subscribers
choose their memberships (i.e., Linus or Bill) at the beginning
of a time period, and all subscribers interact in a membership
selection game. Each subscriber’s membership choice will last
for the whole time period. In Stage II, at each time slot within
the time period, each user decides his network access time
on the AP at his current location (if he is not at home),
hence the users travelling to the same AP interact in a network
access game. Since there are multiple APs in the network, we
will have multiple concurrent network access games. Figure 2
illustrates such a two-stage dynamic game model. We analyze
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of this two-stage game
systematically, and propose best response based algorithms to
achieve the SPE. We also provide numerical results to illustrate
how the system parameters (e.g., users’ mobility patterns and
network access evaluations) affect the SPE.
The key contributions of this work are summarized as below.
• Novel Problem Formulation: To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work that studies the users’ joint
... ...slot  1 slot  2 ... slot  T
One Time Period
Time
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Selection 
Game
Stage I Stage II
Network Access Game (on each AP at each time slot)
Figure 2: Two-Stage Game Model. At each time slot, there is a set
of parallel network access games, each associated with an AP.
membership selection and network access problem in a
crowdsourced wireless community network.
• Practical Relevance: Our model captures several key
practical issues, such as the user mobility pattern, net-
work access evaluation, demand response, and network
congestion effect, which have not been fully considered
before in the context of wireless community networks.
• Equilibrium Analysis: We study the users’ joint member-
ship selection and network access problem from a game-
theoretic perspective, and show how the user parameters
affect their strategies under the game equilibrium: A user
with a more popular home location, a smaller travel
probability, or a smaller network access evaluation is
more likely to choose to be a Bill.
• Industry Insights: Our analysis can help the operator
optimize the network pricing and incentive mechanism
to achieve a maximum profit.
The rest of the paper is organized as below. In Section II,
we review the existing related literature. In Section III, we
present the system model. In Sections IV and V, we analyze
the network access game in Stage II and membership selection
game in Stage I, respectively. We show simulation results
and derive engineering insights in Section VI, and conclude
in Section VII. Due to space limit, most of the proofs are
presented in the online technical report [20].
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are several closely related studies in wireless com-
munity networks, regarding incentive issues [5], the network
expansion and interactions with traditional ISP [9] [10], and
the pricing mechanism design [11] [12]. Camponovo and
Picco-Schwendener in [5] concluded based on surveys that
getting free Internet access from other members and revenue
sharing are the two main incentives for users to join the
FON network in Switzerland. Manshaei et al. in [9] modeled
a user’s payoff as a function of the subscription fee and
network coverage, and studied the evolution dynamics of
wireless community networks. Biczok et al. in [10] studied the
competition and cooperation among users, wireless community
network operator, and ISPs. Authors in [11] [12] focused on
the pricing issues in wireless community networks.
In this work, we study both the membership selection
and network access in a crowdsourced wireless community
network. Neither problem has been systematically studied in
the existing literature. Our model not only captures the Internet
access sharing and revenue sharing as pointed out in [5], but
also incorporates the impact of users mobility and the network
congestion effect. This makes our model and the derived
insights more comprehensive and practically significant.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. The Network Model
As illustarted in Figure 1, we consider a crowdsourced
wireless community network launched by a network operator,
consisting of a set KS = {1, 2, . . . ,K} of subscribers (owning
Wi-Fi APs) and a set KA = {K + 1,K + 2, ...,K + KA}
of Aliens (not owning Wi-Fi APs). We denote the set of all
users (including subscribers and Aliens) by KU = KS
⋃KA.
A subscriber owns a private residential Wi-Fi AP and shares
it with other users, while an Alien does not own Wi-Fi AP
but can access subscribers’ APs. The network operator offers
two memberships, i.e., Linus and Bill, to its subscribers,
corresponding to different incentive schemes. Specifically,
• As a Linus, a subscriber contributes his own AP without
receiving compensation, and can use other APs free of
charge;
• As a Bill, a subscriber needs to pay for using other APs,
and can obtain a portion of the revenue collected at his
AP by the operator.
An Alien has to pay for using any AP (as he does not
contribute to the network). For clarity, we summarize the
above three user types in Table I.
We consider a long time period (e.g., six months) consisting
of T time slots (e.g., five minutes per time slot). Without loss
of generality, we normalize the length of each time slot to be
one. Each subscriber makes the membership decision at the
beginning of the time period, and cannot change such choice
for the entire time period. Users move randomly across time
slots, and do not change their locations within a time slot. Let
ηi,j , i ∈ KU, j ∈ KS denote the (stationary) probability that a
(subscriber or Alien) user i ∈ KU appears at the location of AP
j ∈ KS in any time slot, and ηi,0 denote the probability that
user i appears at a location that is not covered by any of the K
Wi-Fi APs. We further define ηi = [ηi,0, ηi,1, . . . , ηi,K ] as user
i’s mobility pattern. Obviously,
∑K
j=0 ηi,j = 1, ∀i ∈ KU.
To ensure a subscriber’s Quality of Service (QoS) at his
home location, each Wi-Fi AP splits the bandwidth into two
separate channels (similar as the current practice of FON
[13]): a Private Channel for supporting its own communi-
cations, and a Public Channel for supporting roaming users’
communications (from other subscribers and Aliens traveling
to this location). Hence, roaming users’ communications will
not interfere with a subscriber’s own communication, and the
network congestion only occurs among multiple users on the
same public channel.
B. The Operator and Users Interactions
The operator and the users (both subscribers and Aliens)
interact in the following order.
First, the network operator announces the pricing and incen-
tive mechanism at the beginning of the time period, including
Table I: A Summary of Three User Types
User Type Pay for using other APs Paid by sharing his AP
Linus No No
Bills Yes Yes
Aliens Yes Not Applicable
(i) the price per unit connection time [6] paid by Aliens and
Bills, denoted by p ∈ (0, pMAX], and (ii) the percentage of
revenue transferred to Bills, denoted by δ ∈ (0, 1). In this
paper, we will treat (p, δ) as fixed system parameters, and
focus on studying the user behaviours. This is because a full
understanding of user behaviours is the first step towards the
operator’s optimal pricing and incentive mechanism design.
In Section VI, we will numerically illustrate how to properly
choose (p, δ) to optimize the operator’s profit.
Second, given the operator’s announcement (p, δ), each
subscriber i ∈ KS chooses his membership xi ∈ {0, 1} for
the entire period of T time slots, where 0 and 1 correspond
to “Linus” and “Bill”, respectively. The objective of each
subscriber is to choose the best membership that maximizes his
overall payoff during the period of T time slots, considering
users’ mobility patterns as well as his demand and evaluation
for network access (see Section IV for more details).
Third, given the operator’s announcement (p, δ) and the
subscribers’ membership selections {xi, i ∈ KS}, each user
(subscriber or Alien) further decides the network usage in each
time slot, i.e., the network access time at the AP of his current
location during that time slot. When staying at home, a sub-
scriber uses his private channel exclusively, and his network
access decision is independent of other users’ decisions. When
accessing the Internet through another subscriber’s AP, a user
(subscriber or Alien) needs to compete for the public channel
with other users at the same AP (except the owner of that
AP), hence his optimal network access time depends on other
users’ network access decisions.
In this work, we focus on the user decision problem, i.e.,
the subscribers’ membership selections and the users’ network
access decisions, given the pricing and incentive mechanism
announced by the operator.
C. Game Formulation
We formulate the joint membership selection and network
access problem as a two-stage dynamic game, as illustrated in
Figure 2. In Stage I, subscribers participate in a membership
selection game at the beginning of the whole time period,
where each subscriber chooses his membership (Linus or Bill)
for the whole time period. In Stage II, at each time slot, users
travelling to the same AP participate in a network access game,
where each user decides his network access time on that AP.
Namely, each AP is associated with a network access game at
each time slot.
In what follows, we will analyze the two-stage game by
backward induction, starting from Stage II.
IV. STAGE II: NETWORK ACCESS GAME ON EACH AP
We first study the network access game on a single AP at a
single time slot in Stage II, given the subscribers’ membership
selections {xi, i ∈ KS} in Stage I and the operator’s pricing
and incentive mechanism (p, δ). In this game, a user decides
the network access time on the AP at his current location,
aiming at maximizing his payoff in the current time slot.
A. Network Access Game Formulation
Without loss of generality, we consider the network access
game on a particular AP k at a particular time slot t. Recall
that the length of a single time slot is normalized to be 1.
The players are all users travelling to AP k (except the
owner of AP k) at time slot t, denoted by K(k, t) =
KS(k, t)
⋃KA(k, t), where KS(k, t) and KA(k, t) are the sets
of subscribers and Aliens at this location and time, respec-
tively. For notational convenience, we will ignore the time
index t and write the player set as K(k) = KS(k)
⋃KA(k) in
the rest of this section, with the understanding that we already
focus on a single time slot t.
The strategy of each player i ∈ K(k) is to decide the
network access time σi,k ∈ [0, 1] on AP k. We denote the
strategies of all players in K(k) except i as σ−i,k = {σj,k, j 6=
i, j ∈ K(k)}.
The payoff of player i is a function of his own strat-
egy σi,k and other players’ strategies σ−i,k, denoted by
vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) (to be defined later).
The network access game on AP k (at time slot t) and the
corresponding Nash equilibrium are defined as follows.
Game (Network Access Game on AP k).
• Players: the set K(k) of users;
• Strategies: σi,k ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ K(k);
• Payoffs: vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), ∀i ∈ K(k).
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium of the Network Access Game
on AP k (at time slot t) is a profile σ∗k = {σi,k,∀i ∈ K(k)}
such that for each user i ∈ K(k),
vi,k(σ
∗
i,k,σ
∗
−i,k) ≥ vi,k(σi,k,σ∗−i,k), ∀σi,k ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the Nash equilibrium σ∗k depends on the player
set K(k), hence can be written as σ∗k(K(k)).
B. Utility and Payoff Definition
Before analyzing the Nash equilibrium, we first define users’
utility and payoff functions.
1) Utility: The utility captures a user’s satisfaction for
accessing the Internet for a certain amount of time. Due to
the principle of diminishing marginal returns [14], [15], the
utility function is often increasing and concave. As a concrete
example, we define the utility of user i ∈ K(k) on AP k as
ui(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ρi log(1 + r¯i,k(σ−i,k) · σi,k). (1)
Here ρi is the network access evaluation of user i, charac-
terizing user i’s valuation of data consumption. Furthermore,
r¯i,k(σ−i,k) is the expected data rate that user i can achieve
on AP k, which is a decreasing function of other users’
network access vector σ−i,k. Intuitively, if more users access
AP k’s public channel simultaneously, user i’s achieved data
rate will decrease due to the increased congestion. Obviously,
r¯i,k(σ−i,k) · σi,k denotes the total expected amount of data
that user i consumes on AP k (at time slot t).
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Figure 3: Average Data Rate per User [16]
Next, we derive the user i’s expected data rate r¯i,k(σ−i,k).
Let R¯(n) denote the average data rate of a Wi-Fi user when
n users connect to the same Wi-Fi AP simultaneously. Let
Pi,k(n) denote the probability that n other users (except i)
connect to AP k. Then, user i’s expected data rate r¯i,k(σ−i,k)
at AP k can be calculated as follows:
r¯i,k(σ−i,k) =
|K(k)|−1∑
n=0
Pi,k(n) · R¯(n+ 1). (2)
According to IEEE 802.11g standard [16], we have:
R¯(n) =
τ τ¯n−1L
τ¯nTb + [(1− τ¯n)− nτ τ¯n−1]Tc + nτ τ¯n−1Ts ,
where τ is the average successful probability of contention
(and τ¯ = 1 − τ ), L is the average payload length, Tb is the
length of a backoff slot, Tc is the length of a collision slot,
and Ts is the length of a successful slot. Figure 3 illustrates
an example of R¯(·) under IEEE 802.11g standard (reproduced
from [16], with parameters τ = 0.0765, L = 8192, Tb = 28µs,
and Tc = Ts = 85.7 +L/54µs). The decreasing data rate per
user is due to both the reduced resource per user and the waste
of resources caused by congestion among users.
For simplicity, we further assume that if a user i decides to
connect to the channel with a total time of σi,k ∈ [0, 1], he
will spread this access time randomly and uniformly across
the entire time slot. Recall that the length of a time slot is
normalized to 1. Hence, the probability that user i connects to
AP k in an infinitely small time interval within the time slot is
σi,k. Therefore, the probabilities Pi,k(n), n = 0, 1, ..., |K(k)|−
1, follow the binomial distribution (with a total of |K(k)| trials
and a success probability σj,k for each trial j ∈ K(k)/{i}).
Formally, we have:
Pi,k(n) =
∑
Kn∈Kn(k)
 ∏
j∈Kn
σj,k ·
∏
j∈K(k)/{i}/Kn
(1− σj,k)
 ,
where Kn denotes an arbitrary subset of K(k) with n users
(except i), and Kn(k) denotes the set of all possible Kn.
Obviously,
∏
j∈Kn σj,k denotes the probability that all users
in Kn are connecting to AP k, and
∏
j∈K(k)/{i}/Kn(1−σj,k)
denotes the probability that all other users (except user i and
those in Kn) are not connecting to AP k.
2) Payoff: The payoff of each user i ∈ K(k) in the
network access game on AP k (at time slot t) is defined as
the difference between the utility and the payment (charged to
Bills and Aliens).
Specifically, if user i is a Linus (i.e., i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 0),
he does not need to pay for his network usage at AP k. Hence,
the payoff of a Linus-type user i on AP k, denoted by vLi,k, is
the same as his utility defined in (1), i.e.,
vLi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ui(σi,k,σ−i,k). (3)
If user i is a Bill (i.e., i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 1) or Alien (i.e.,
i ∈ KA(k)), he needs to pay for his network usage on AP k,
and the payment is proportional to his network access time
σi,k. Hence, the payoff of a Bill-type or Alien user i, denoted
by vBi,k, is the difference between utility and payment, i.e.,
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) = ui(σi,k,σ−i,k)− pσi,k. (4)
Based on the above, we can summarize the payoff of user
i ∈ K(k) in the Network Access Game (on AP k) as follows:
vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) =
vLi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 0;
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KS(k) and xi = 1;
vBi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k), if i ∈ KA(k).
(5)
C. Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Now we study the Nash equilibrium of the above Network
Access Game (on AP k) systematically.4
Given all other users’ strategies, a user’s best response is the
strategy that maximizes his payoff. The Nash equilibrium is a
strategy profile where each user’s strategy is the best response
to other users’ strategies.
Lemma 1. If user i is a Linus, his best response in the Network
Access Game on AP k is
σ∗i,k = 1, (6)
regardless of other users’ strategies.
Lemma 2. If user i is a Bill or an Alien, his best response in
the Network Access Game on AP k is
σ∗i,k = min
{
1,max
{
ρi
p
− 1
r¯i,k(σ−i,k)
, 0
}}
, (7)
which is a function of other users’ strategies σ−i,k.
We next give the existence of the Nash equilibrium in the
Network Access Game.
Theorem 1. There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the
Network Access Game on AP k.
Now we discuss the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
the Network Access Game on AP k.
Proposition 1. In a Network Access Game with two players,
the Nash equilibrium is unique if R¯(1)−R¯(2)
(R¯(2))2
< 1.
Note that the condition in Proposition 1 is always satisfied
for practical WiFi systems [16]. For the cases with more than
two players, however, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
depends on the system parameters in a more complicated
fashion. Please refer to our technical report [20] for more
detailed discussions.
4Due to space limit, we put most of the detailed proofs in the online
technical report [20].
We further propose a best response update algorithm, which
is guaranteed to linearly converge to the Nash equilibrium
under the same condition for the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium. For details, see [20].
V. STAGE I: MEMBERSHIP SELECTION GAME
Now we study the subscribers’ membership selection game
in Stage I, given the operator’s pricing and incentive mech-
anism (p, δ). In this stage, each subscriber i ∈ KS decides
his membership type xi ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., Linus or Bill) at the
beginning of the period, aiming at maximizing the overall
payoff that he can achieve in all T time slots. Note that an
Alien i ∈ KA cannot choose his type, as he has no Wi-Fi AP
and does not contribute to the network.
A. Membership Selection Game Formulation
In the Membership Selection Game, players are all sub-
scribers in the set KS. The strategy of each player i ∈ KS
is to decide his membership xi ∈ {0, 1}, with xi = 0 and
1 denoting Linus and Bill, respectively. Such a membership
choice will last for the whole time period. We denote the
strategies of all players except i by x−i = {xj , j 6= i, j ∈ KS}.
The overall payoff of a player i is sum of the total expected
payoff on all APs that he may travel to and the total expected
revenue that he may collect at his own AP (if choosing to
be a Bill) during T slots. Obviously, it is a function of his
own strategy xi and other players’ strategies x−i, denoted by
Vi(xi,x−i) (to be defined later).
Formally, the Membership Selection Game and the corre-
sponding Nash equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Game (Membership Selection Game).
• Players: the set KS of subscribers.
• Strategies: xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ KS.
• Payoffs: Vi(xi,x−i), ∀i ∈ KS.
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium of the Membership Selection
Game is a profile x∗ = {x∗i , i ∈ KS} such that for each
subscriber i ∈ KS,
Vi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ Vi(xi,x∗−i), ∀xi ∈ {0, 1}.
We note that the Nash equilibria in Stage II (Definition 1)
and Stage I (Definition 2) together form a Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) of the whole game.
B. Payoff Definition
Before analyzing the Nash equilibrium, we first explicitly
calculate each subscriber’s overall payoff during the whole
period, which includes (i) the total expected payoff on all APs
that he may travel to, and (ii) the potential revenue that he may
collect on his own AP (if choosing to be a Bill).
We first calculate the total expected payoff of each sub-
scriber (on all APs that he may travel to), which depends on
his mobility pattern. Recall that the mobility of a subscriber i is
characterized by the probabilities of travelling to different APs,
i.e., ηi = [ηi,0, ηi,1, . . . , ηi,K ], where ηi,k is the probability of
subscriber i travelling to AP k, and ηi,0 is the probability of
subscriber i travelling to an area that is not covered by any of
the K Wi-Fi APs. We calculate subscriber i’s expected payoffs
(per time slot) when staying at home and when roaming
outside, respectively.
1) Stay at home (with probability ηi,i): When staying at
home, subscriber i communicates over the private channel
of AP i and does not interfere with other users. Hence his
expected payoff, denoted by Vi,i(xi,x−i), is
Vi,i(xi,x−i) = ρi · log(1 + r¯i · 1),
where constant r¯i corresponds to the average data rate
achieved at his private channel. The product term r¯i ·1 implies
that user i will access the Internet during the entire time slot.
2) Travel to AP k 6= i (with probability ηi,k): When
travelling to another AP k 6= i, subscriber i needs to compete
over the public channel with other users (except k) travelling
to AP k at the same time (in the Network Access Game).
Suppose that a set M(k) of other users (except i and k)
are travelling to AP k at the same time. That is, the game
player set in the Network Access Game on AP k is K(k) =
M(k)⋃{i}. For more clarity, let us rewrite the equilibrium
payoff of subscriber i on AP k, i.e., vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k) defined
in (5), as vi,k(σi,k,σ−i,k|M(k)), when competing with a set
M(k) of other users (in the Network Access Game on AP k).
Hence, the expected payoff of subscriber i on AP k is
Vi,k(xi,x−i) =
∑
M(k)∈K−{i,k}
φ(M(k))vi,k(σ∗i,k,σ∗−i,k|M(k)),
where φ(M(k)) is the probability that a set M(k) of users
are travelling to AP k, (σ∗i,k,σ
∗
−i,k) is the corresponding
equilibrium of the Network Access Game, and K−{i,k} is the
power set of KU/{i, k}, i.e., the set of all subsets of KU/{i, k}.
The probability φ(M(k)) is given by5
φ(M(k)) =
∏
j∈M(k)
ηj,k ·
∏
j∈KU/{i,k}/M(k)
(1− ηj,k),
where
∏
j∈M(k) ηj,k denotes the probability that all users in
M(k) are travelling to AP k, and ∏j∈KU/{i,k}/M(k)(1−ηj,k)
denotes the probability that all other users (except users i, k,
and those in M(k)) are not travelling to AP k.
3) Travel outside the network coverage (with probability
ηi,0): When travelling to an area that is not covered by any of
the K Wi-Fi APs, the expected payoff of subscriber i, denoted
by Vi,0(xi,x−i), is6
Vi,0(xi,x−i) = 0.
Based on the above, the total expected payoff of subscriber
i (on all APs that he may travel to during the whole period of
T time slots) is
V †i (xi,x−i) = T ·
K∑
k=0
ηi,k · Vi,k(xi,x−i). (8)
Next, we calculate the total expected potential revenue that
each subscriber i may collect on his own AP. Specifically, if
5In this work, we study the complete information scenario where users’
mobility patterns are public information.
6If a user can access the Internet through other means, we can normalize
the corresponding constant payoff to be zero without affecting the analysis.
choosing to be a Linus, subscriber i obtains a zero revenue
from his AP.7 If choosing to be a Bill, subscriber i obtains a
fixed portion δ of the revenue collected at his AP.
Suppose that a set K(i) of other users (except i) are
travelling to AP i. That is, the player set in the Network
Access Game on AP i is K(i). Then, the Nash equilibrium
in the Network Access Game on AP i can be written as
{σ∗j,i(K(i)),∀j ∈ K(i)}. Recall that the revenue collected at
each AP is the total payment of all Aliens and Bills (except the
owner of that AP) accessing that AP. Hence, the total revenue
collected at AP i is
Πi(x−i,K(i)) =
∑
j∈K(i)⋂KA
p · σ∗j,i(K(i))
+
∑
j∈K(i)⋂KS
xj · p · σ∗j,i(K(i)),
where the first term is the payment of Aliens, and the second
term is the payment of Bills. Hence, the total expected
payment of Bills and Aliens at AP i is
Π¯i(x−i) =
∑
K(i)∈K−i
ψ(K(i)) ·Πi(x−i,K(i)),
where ψ(K(i)) is the probability that a set K(i) of users are
travelling to AP i, and K−i is the power set of KU/{i}. The
probability ψ(K(i)) is given by
ψ(K(i)) =
∏
j∈K(i)
ηj,i ·
∏
j∈KU/{i}/K(i)
(1− ηj,i).
Based on the above, the total expected revenue that a Bill
subscriber i can achieve at his own AP (during the whole time
period of T time slots) is
V ‡i (xi,x−i) = xi · T · δ · Π¯i(x−i). (9)
Combining the total expected payoff in (8) and the total
expected revenue in (9), we obtain the overall payoff of each
subscriber in the Membership Selection Game as follows
Vi(xi,x−i) = V
‡
i (xi,x−i) + V
†
i (xi,x−i)
= T ·
(
xi · δ · Π¯i(x−i) +
K∑
k=0
ηi,k · Vi,k(xi,x−i)
)
.
(10)
C. Nash Equilibrium Analysis
A subscriber i will make the membership decision to
maximize the overall payoff defined in (10). Specifically, he
will choose to be a Linus if Vi(0,x−i) > Vi(1,x−i), and
choose to be a Bill otherwise. For notational convenience, we
denote fi(x−i) as the gap between Vi(1,x−i) and Vi(0,x−i):
fi(x−i) = Vi(1,x−i)− Vi(0,x−i). (11)
Hence, subscriber i will choose to be a Linus if fi(x−i) < 0,
and choose to be a Bill if fi(x−i) ≥ 0. Mathematically, this is
equivalent to choosing xi from {0, 1}, such that the following
condition holds: (2xi − 1) · fi(x−i) ≥ 0.
Next, we study the Nash equilibrium of the Membership
Selection Game.
7The operator still charges Bills and Aliens for using a Linus’ AP.
Lemma 3. A membership profile x∗ is an Nash equilibrium
of the Membership Selection Game, if and only if
(2x∗i − 1) · fi(x∗−i) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ K.
Proposition 2. For each subscriber i, if
ηi,i > ηi , 1−
δ · Π¯i(x∗−i)∑
k∈KS/{i}
(
Vi,k(0,x∗−i)− Vi,k(1,x∗−i)
) ,
choosing Bill (i.e., xi = 1) is his best response.
Intuitively, a subscriber with a large probability of staying
at home will choose to be a Bill, as his network usage on
other APs is small, hence the benefit of obtaining revenue at
his own AP outweighs the payment at other APs.
Unfortunately, the above Membership Selection Game may
not always have an Nash equilibrium defined in Definition 2,
which is a pure strategy equilibrium where each subscriber
chooses either to be a Bill or a Linus. To illustrate this, we
provide a simple example with 3 APs in our technical report
[20]. Hence, in what follows, we will further look at the case
of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where each subscriber
chooses membership with probability.
D. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
For each subscriber i, his mixed strategy can be character-
ized as the probability αi ∈ [0, 1] of choosing to be a Bill
(hence the probability of choosing to be a Linus is 1 − αi).
Obviously, the pure strategy xi is a special case of the mixed
strategy when αi equals 1 or 0. For writing convenience, we
denote the mixed strategy profile of all subscribers except i as
α−i = {αj , j 6= i, j ∈ KS}.
Then, the expected payoff of subscriber i can be defined as
ωi(αi,α−i) = αi · V˜i(1,α−i) + (1− αi) · V˜i(0,α−i), (12)
where V˜i(1,α−i) and V˜i(0,α−i) are expected payoffs of sub-
scriber i when choosing to be a Bill and a Linus, respectively.
Note that V˜i(1,α−i) and V˜i(0,α−i) are the expected values on
all possible membership selections of other users. Specifically,
there are K−1 other subscribers, hence 2K−1 possible mem-
bership selection combination of those subscribers, forming a
set X−i. Notice that each subscriber j chooses xj = 1 and
0 with probabilities αj and 1 − αj , respectively. Then, the
probability that a particular x−i ∈ X−i is realized is
ψ(x−i) =
∏
j∈KS/{i}
(
αj · xj + (1− αj) · (1− xj)
)
.
Then, V˜i(1,α−i) and V˜i(0,α−i) can be calculated by
V˜i(xi,α−i) =
∑
x−i∈X−i
ψ(x−i) · Vi(xi,x−i), xi ∈ {0, 1},
where Vi(xi,x−i) is the overall payoff of subscriber i under
the pure strategy profile defined in (10).
Definition 3. A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the Mem-
bership Selection Game is a probability profile α∗ such that
for each subscriber i ∈ KS, we have:
ωi(α
∗
i ,α
∗
−i) ≥ ωi(αi,α∗−i), ∀αi ∈ [0, 1].
We first show the existence of the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the Membership Selection Game.
Theorem 2. In the Membership Selection Game, there exists
at least one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, to compute the Nash equilibrium effectively, We
design a smoothed best response updated algorithm, where
each player updates his mixed strategy in a smoothed best re-
sponse manner according to the other players’ mixed strategies
in the previous iteration. Using the result in [19], we can show
that such a smoothed best response with some learning rules
(as in fictitious play) converges to the mixed strategy Nash
equilibria. Details of the algorithm is shown in Appendix [20].
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we numerically study how the network
access valuation parameter ρi and the mobility pattern ηi
influence subscriber i’s membership selection decision, given
other system parameters fixed.
In Section VI-A, we will first simulate a small network with
2 APs and 1 Alien, to gain insights of a single user’s best
choice. Then, in Section VI-B, we simulate a large network
with 100 APs and 10 Aliens to understand the system-level
performance.
A. A Small Network Example
We simulate a small network with 2 subscribers (each owns
an AP) and 1 Alien. We study how subscriber 1’s network
access valuation parameter ρ1 and his probability of staying
at home η1,1 affect his membership selection.
We assume that the revenue sharing ratio δ = 0.5. The price
at both APs is the same p = 1. The mobility patterns of sub-
scriber 2 and the Alien are same: η2 = ηa = [1/3, 1/3, 1/3].
We assume that ρ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Subscriber 1 stays at home with
probability η1,1, and travels to AP 2 and outside the Wi-Fi
coverage with a same probability η1,2 = η1,0 = (1− η1,1)/2.
Figure 4 shows subscriber 1’s membership selection deci-
sion in the equilibrium (Definition 3 in Section V-D), under
different ρi ∈ [0, 1] and η1,1 ∈ [0, 1]. The color represents the
value of α1, which is subscriber 1’s probability of choosing
to be a Bill. The black region corresponds to α1 = 1, and
the white region corresponds to α1 = 0. The color in between
corresponds to a mixed strategy of α1 ∈ (0, 1), as shown in
the colorbar on the right.
Figure 4 shows that when η1,1 is large enough (i.e., larger
than 0.82), i.e., subscriber 1 stays at home most of the time, his
will always choose to be a Bill with the probability α1 = 1,
independent of subscriber 2’s membership decision. As η1,1
becomes smaller and ρ1 becomes larger, the performance and
payment during roaming becomes increasingly important, so
subscriber 1 starts to choose a mixed strategy with a smaller
number of α1. When η1,1 is small enough and ρ1 is large
enough, e.g., the right bottom corner of Figure 4, he will
always choose to be a Linus with a probability 1− α1 = 1.
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Figure 6: Operator’s Revenue
B. Simulation Results for Large Network
In this subsection, we simulate a larger network with 100
APs and 10 Aliens.
1) Impact of Location Popularity: We first study how the
location popularity of an AP affects the subscriber’s member-
ship selection decision. The location popularity is measured
by the probabilities of users showing up at that location. For
simplicity, we assume that all users show up at the same
location with the same probability, and the location popularity
of APs 1 to 100 increases.
Figure 5 shows each of the 100 subscribers’ membership
selection decision. The three curves represent three different
values of the subscriber’s network access valuation parameter
ρi. Under a given ρi, the subscriber’s probability of choosing
to be a Bill increases with his AP location popularity. The
reason is that a subscriber whose AP is located at a more
popular location can earn more revenue from other Bills and
Aliens. For a particular subscriber (a fixed AP index), as
his network access valuation ρi increases, his probability of
choosing to be a Bill decreases. This is because he cares more
about the network access benefit when roaming, and hence is
more willing to be a Linus to enjoy free access and consume
more data during roaming.
2) Operator’s Revenue: Finally we discuss how the opera-
tor can utilize the analysis in this paper to optimize its revenue.
In particular, the operator can optimize p and δ, based on the
users’ equilibrium membership selection and network access
decisions.
Figure 6 presents contours of the operator’s revenue with
respect to p and δ. In this case, the optimal price and revenue
sharing ratio for the operator are p∗ = 0.58 and δ∗ = 0.63,
which lead to an average revenue of 11.40 (per time slot) for
the operator. We can further see that the operator’s maximum
revenue is approximately 8.00 if there is no incentive (i.e.,
δ = 0), in which case the optimal price is around p = 1. On the
other hand, the operator’s maximum revenue is approximately
1.00 under another extreme case with the maximum incentive
(i.e., δ = 1), where the optimal price is around p = 0.3. Hence,
with proper incentive, the operator can increase its maximum
revenue up to 30% and 90%, respectively, compered with those
cases without incentive and with maximum incentive.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we set up a two-stage membership selection
and network access game model for the crowdsourced wireless
community network. We analyze the game equilibria of both
games systematically, and show that such an equilibrium
analysis can help the operator make optimal pricing and
incentive mechanism design. We show that a user with a more
popular home location, a smaller probability of travelling, or a
smaller network access evaluation is more likely to choose to
be a Bill. There are several interesting directions for future
researches. First, it is interesting to theoretically study the
operator’s optimal pricing design. Our result in this work
serves as an important first step towards this problem. Second,
it is also interesting to study the problem under incomplete
information, where some parameters (e.g., user network access
valuation ρ, user mobility pattern η) are private information.
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